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25X1

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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State Department review completed

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The President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Chief of Staff, United States Army  
Chief of Naval Operations  
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

## SUMMARY

25X1

## FAR EAST

3. De Lattre will request more troops for Indochina (page 4).

## NEAR EAST

4. US Embassy Moscow believes Soviet diplomatic approach to Turkey possible soon (page 4).

25X1A



25X1

3. De Lattre will request more troops for Indochina:

25X1A

General De Lattre has stated that he has "fair hopes" of obtaining the 20,300 additional troops, consisting of 6,300 French troops, 7,000 Africans and 7,000 Indochinese recruited locally, which he is going to request while in Paris. De Lattre believes that the greatest danger from a Chinese Communist invasion exists from now until May 1 and that, after that time, his defense preparations will be in an "advanced stage." US Legation Saigon concurs in De Lattre's estimate of needed reinforcements, and comments that De Lattre previously believed the period of greatest danger would not end until June 1.

✓ I NDOCHINA

Comment: The continuing delay in creating a Vietnamese army makes these reinforcements all the more necessary. De Lattre has threatened to resign if his demands are not met; it is expected they will be substantially fulfilled regardless of possible changes in the French cabinet.

## NEAR EAST

4. US Embassy Moscow believes Soviet diplomatic approach to Turkey possible soon:✓ TURKEY  
✓ USSR

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US Embassy Moscow views seriously the possibility that the Soviet Union may soon present a diplomatic demarche to Turkey suggesting a renewal of their non-aggression treaty, perhaps offering "moderate" proposals concerning the straits, and waiving territorial claims to the Kars and Ardahan districts. For some months, according to the Embassy, a pattern of Soviet "sweet reasonableness" has become apparent as part of Soviet efforts to neutralize Near Eastern countries. Since Turkey alone in the Near East possesses the

25X1A

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capability of substantial resistance to the USSR in case of war, the Embassy believes that "neutralization" of Turkey is a major objective of Soviet policy.

25X1

- 5 -

25X1A

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